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This paper proposes a matching model that distinguishes between job creation by existing ﬁrms and job
creation by ﬁrm entrants. The paper argues that vacancy posting and job destruction on the extensive
margin, i.e. from ﬁrms that enter and exit the labour market, represents a potentially viable mechanism
for understanding the cyclical properties of vacancies and unemployment. The model features both hiring
freeze and bankruptcies, where the former represents a sudden shut down of vacancy posting at the ﬁrm level
with labour downsizing governed by natural turnover. A bankrupt ﬁrm, conversely, shut down its vacancies
and lay oﬀs its stock of workers. Recent research in macroeconomics has shown that a calibration of the
Mortensen and Pissarides matching model account for 10 percent of the cyclical variability of the vacancy
unemployment ratio displayed by U.S. data. A calibration of the model that explicitly considers hiring freeze
and bankruptcy can account for 20 to 35 percent of the variability displayed by the data.
Key Words: unemployment dynamics, matching models
JEL Classiﬁcation:J 3 01I n t r o d u c t i o n
The matching model of unemployment, or the Mortensen Pissarides (hereafter MP) (1994) model, is generally
recognized as the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labor market. A recent debate has challenged
the ability of the MP model to capture the key business cycle properties of the U.S. labour market. Shimer
(2005a) has argued that a calibration of the model can hardly match the key business cycle facts. Notably, the
vacancy unemployment ratio in the U.S. data features a time series variability that is an order of magnitude
larger than what a reasonable calibration of the model would predict.
Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005a), among others, have argued that the main problem of the MP model is
the large response of wages to business cycle ﬂuctuations. Wages absorb most of the productivity ﬂuctuations
and prevent vacancy and job creation to adequately respond to business cycle ﬂuctuations. Yet, a solution
of the model with a ﬁxed wage does not really solve the problem. Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) have
shown that the key issue is not wage variability, but rather the level of the average wage vis-à-vis the average
productivity. Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) consider also the role of on the job search and capital costs and
show that an extended model can account for roughly 40 percent of the variability displayed by the data.
A theoretical shortcoming of the MP model is its inability to proper distinguish between well deﬁned
ﬁrms and jobs. In the baseline model all ﬁrms have only one job. As a result there is no role for job
destruction and vacancy posting by ﬁrm entry and exit as distinguished by job creation and destruction by
existing ﬁrms. At the macroeconomic level, job creation and job destruction accounted for by ﬁrm entry and
exit is well documented, and accounts for 3.8 percent of total employment (Business Employment Dynamics,
2004). The quantitative question addressed in this paper concerns the macroeconomic implications, in terms
of aggregate vacancy unemployment volatility, of considering job ﬂows on the ﬁrms’ extensive margin.
This paper proposes a matching model of the labour market that distinguishes between job creation by
existing ﬁrms and job creation by ﬁrm entrants. It builds on the matching model with large ﬁrms initially
proposed by Bertola Cabalero (1994), and further analysed by Bertola Garibaldi (2001) and Cahuc et al.
(2005). While ﬁrms produce with a constant returns to scale technology, their long run dimension is bound
by a convex hiring technology. Exogenous job destruction, in the form of worker natural turnover, ensures
that ﬁrms continuously post vacancies. The comparative static predictions of the steady state equilibrium of
the model are very similar to the standard Pissarides matching model (1987). Further, the model converges
to a standard matching model as the convex vacancy costs converge to a linear cost structure.
The paper argues that vacancy posting and job destruction on the extensive margin, i.e. from ﬁrms
that enter and exit the labour market, represents a potentially viable mechanism for understanding the
cyclical properties of the vacancy unemployment ﬂuctuations. In the aftermath of positive aggregate shocks,
incumbents ﬁrms immediately increase their vacancy posting behavior. This increase in job creation by
existing ﬁrms is akin to the increase in job creation in the standard matching model. Yet, the model predicts
1that alongside the bulk of insider ﬁrms there is a margin of highly volatile ﬁrms. Such ﬁrms act mainly on
the extensive margin of ﬁrm entry and exit. Following a positive aggregate productivity shock new ﬁrms
will enter the market and, on impact, will post a discrete mass of vacancies to satisfy their medium run
employment position. Thereafter, they grow slowly to their desired employment position. In the aftermath
of negative shocks, a positive mass of ﬁrms immediately shut down their vacancy posting, inducing a well
deﬁned hiring freeze. Whether such ﬁrms shed labour and declare bankruptcy depends on the structure and
size of wasteful ﬁring costs. In equilibrium it may well be optimal for some ﬁrms to operate under hiring
freeze, let dismissal be regulated by natural turnover and vacancy posting postponed to periods of favorable
business conditions.
The vacancy posting and job destruction induced by these marginal ﬁrms is novel to the literature.
In the set of simulations proposed, the paper starts from a simple characterization of the Shimer result.
Without considering hiring freeze or bankruptcy, the model accounts for 10 percent of the total variability
of the vacancy unemployment ratio. Explicitly considering job ﬂows on the extensive margin increases the
ampliﬁcation power of the model. Speciﬁcally, a simulation of the model with ﬁrm entry and exit accounts
for at least 20 percent of the aggregate volatility displayed by U.S. data, and increases to 30 percent in an
economy with widespread hiring freeze.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic environment. Section 3 describes hiring and
ﬁring at the ﬁrm level and characterizes bankruptcy and hiring freeze. Section 4 deﬁnes and characterizes
the general equilibrium of the model and its global stability. Section 5 presents the calibration and the
baseline simulations, while section 6 discusses the calibration with ﬁrm entry and exit. Section 7 discusses
our results and compares the results to those in the literature. Section 8 concludes.
2B a s i c E n v i r o n m e n t
• There is a mass one of homogeneous labor. Workers can be in two states, employed or unemployed.
Labour is the only factor of production.
• Employed workers are subject to natural turnover. We assume that each worker has a probability
equal to ρ of experiencing a turnover shock that force he or she to leave the job and entering into
unemployment
• There are I types of ﬁrms which we indicate with i =1 ..I. We indicate with mi a measure of the
mass of ﬁrms of type i. One can think of
X
mi = M as a measure of the stock of entrepreneurial
ideas in the economy. Not all types of ﬁrms are necessarily active at all times. Whenever it is optimal
for the ﬁrm to produce, the ﬁrm uses a constant returns to scale technology and the productivity is
indicated with ηi + pj.
2• ηi is the ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity value. We we assume that ηi+1 >η i Firms with larger idiosyncratic
component ηi have larger labor productivity and larger size in equilibrium.
• pj is an aggregate parameter common across ﬁrms and refers to the aggregate state of the economy.
There are jmax possible macro states and we assume that pj >p k whenever j>k .The probability
of a state switch is governed by a Poisson process and we indicate with λjk the instantaneous arrival
rate of the shock. Conditional on a shock λjk, the state of the economy switches from state j to state





• We shall indicate with mil
ij
t t h es i z eo fw o r k e r se m p l o y e di nﬁrms of type i when the state of the
economy is j.
• Whenever it is optimal to operate a ﬁrm and to post vacancies, the ﬁlling of jobs is both costly and
time consuming. This makes the model perfectly in line with the mainstream matching literature and
the MP model. The probability that a vacancy is ﬁlled is indicated with q
j
t where j refers to the state
of the economy and t is a pure time index.
• The main departure from the standard MP model concerns the structure of vacancy costs. We follow
Bertola and Caballero (1994) and Bertola and Garibaldi (2001) and assume that vacancy posting is
regulated by a convex technology, so that the marginal vacancy posting for ﬁrm i in state j is cv
ij
t
• Each ﬁr mt a k e sa sg i v e nt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fﬁlling in a vacancy q
j
t,o rt h ej o bﬁlling probability as it
is labeled in the paper. In the aggregate economy, the probability q
j
t i sd e s c r i b e db ya na g g r e g a t e
matching function that depends on the aggregate number of vacancies and the stock of unemployed.



















t is the aggregate measure of vacancies and v
ij
t are the vacancies posted by ﬁrm
i when the state of the economy is j. U
j
t is the stock of unemployed and γ is simply an eﬃciency
parameter. α is the matching elasticity of q
j
t with respect to the aggregate vacancy unemployment
ratio and varies strictly between 0 and 1
• Over and beyond the exogenous turnover ρ we assume that ﬁring is instantaneous but requires a
wasteful separation cost equal to −F.W h i l e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f F is important for modelling a pure
hiring freeze, the model works perfectly well with F =0 .
• We assume that wages are constant across ﬁrms and over time, and we indicate their value to w.W e
discuss the importance of this assumption in Section 7 for the business cycle properties of the model,
and in the Appendix we solve a steady state version of the model with endogenous wages.
33 Hiring and Firing at the Firm Level
In what follows we indicate with A
ij
t the marginal shadow value of a vacancy to a ﬁrm of type i in state j
and with J
ij

























The previous equation is similar to the standard asset value function for a marginal vacancy in the matching
model, with the only notable key diﬀerence that the marginal cost of vacancy posting is increasing in the
number of vacancies. The probability of ﬁlling a vacancy (q
j
t) does not depend on ﬁrm characteristics but
simply on the state of the economy j, which each ﬁrm takes as given. Conditional on a macroshock λjk the
ﬁrm obtains the value of a vacancy in state k. Since shutting down vacancy is costless the expression inside
the brackets features a max operator, with ﬁrms that post vacancies as long as Aki
t is strictly positive. If
the ﬁrm posts at all time the optimal number of vacancies it must be true that A
ij
t = ˙ A
ij









This is one of the key equations of the model and it simply says that the marginal cost of posting v
ij
t
v a c a n c i e si se q u a lt oe x p e c t e dm a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt, where the latter is the product of the ﬁlling probability and
the marginal shadow value of labour. The expression of the marginal shadow of labour is
rJ
ij



















The previous expression deserves few comments. The marginal shadow value of labour depends linearly
on the operative proﬁts ηi + pj − w. This is not surprising as long as the ﬁrm operates with a constant
returns technology. Because of natural turnover the ﬁrm loses each unit of labour at rate ρ and experiences
an aggregate shock at rate λjk. Conditional on the aggregate shock λjk the ﬁrm needs to decide whether
continuing production is optimal at the new value Jik
t . Shutting down the job requires a wasteful ﬁring cost
equal to −F.
Once one realizes that the marginal value of vacancy is zero at all time, the shadow marginal value of
labour does not depend on the number of vacancies v
ij
t , on the actual employment level l
ij
t and on the
aggregate state contingent matching probability q
j
t. This suggests that the shadow value of a ﬁlled labour
is time invariant and thus ˙ Jij =0 . This result makes the computation and derivation of the equilibrium
extremely simple. In what follows we suppress the subscript t to the ﬁrm value function.
The value of the marginal job Jij fully describes the ﬁrm hiring and ﬁring policy. In general, as long
as the shadow value of labour is positive, i.e. Jij > 0, the ﬁrm operates and posts a positive amount of
vacancies. Indeed, we call a ﬁrm with positive Jij a fully operative ﬁrm. Formally, the job creation condition
of equation (1) shows that the number of vacancies posted is proportional to the value of Jij.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
4an increase (decrease) in productivity that leads to an increase (decrease) in Jij l e a d st oa ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
number of vacancies posted while a negative shock leads to a contraction in the number of vacancies. Yet,










c if Jij > 0
0 if Jij ≤ 0
(2)
Things are more complicated when the value of a ﬁrm, in the aftermath of a productivity shock, turns
negative. First, whenever Jij < −F the ﬁrm ﬁres immediately all its employees and does not operate.
The ﬁrm is bankrupt and the corresponding entrepreneurial idea i is idle. Thus, a ﬁrm that was previously
operative and sudden experiences Jij ≤− F ﬁres all its workers and declares bankruptcy. Conversely,
whenever 0 ≥ Jij < −F the ﬁrm has incentives to stay in operation. Such ﬁrm freezes hiring, does not ﬁre
its workforce and downsize its workforce thorough the natural turnover ρ. This suggests that employment
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t if Jij > 0
−ρlij,t if 0 ≥ Jij > −F




t is the dynamics of employment at the ﬁrm level. Whenever it is optimal to operate, that is whenever
Jij > 0 ﬁrm employment dynamics is denoted by the diﬀerence between job creation and job destruction.
Job destruction at the ﬁrm level is driven by exogenous worker quits. Job creation is derived by the vacancy




t. No vacancy posting takes place when Jij is negative and
employment is either zero (in the case of bankruptcy) or decline with natural turnover (in the case of natural
turnover).
The previous expression allows us to formally deﬁne employment dynamics.
Deﬁnition 1 Firm employment dynamics features a hiring freeze whenever the ﬁr md o e sn o tp o s ta n y
vacancy and does not replace departing workers. The ﬁrm is bankrupt whenever does not post any vacancy
and does not hire any worker. The ﬁrm is fully operative whenever it posts vacancies and replaces departing
workers.
Making use of the optimal vacancy posting behavior of equation (1), employment dynamics of a ﬁrm that










t if Jij > 0











specify a set of value function Jij, a vacancies v
ij
t , employment l
ij
t that satisfy i) optimal vacancy posting
(equation 2) and ii) optimal employment dynamics (equation 3).
5We can discuss at this stage an important equilibrium feature of the ﬁrm value function. The solution
to the ﬁrm problem is obtained by the functional equation
J
ij =




r + λjk + ρ
(4)
where it appears that the job value function is proportional to the productivity pj+ηi. The following remark
applies
Remark 3 Bankruptcy and Hiring Freeze are more likely in worse business conditions (lower / j)a n di n
ﬁrms with lower idiosyncratic component (lower i).
The model is completed by the workers’ asset equations, which nevertheless do not play any speciﬁc role
in the model with exogenous and ﬁxed wage w. If we indicate with W
ij
t the value to a worker of being in
ﬁrm i and with B
j
t the value of unemployment when the state of the economy is j,t h ev a l u eo faj o bt oa
worker in ﬁrm i reads
rW
ij
























where w i st h ew a g er a t ea n dφ
ik is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if a ﬁrm i keeps the job







































where b is a speciﬁc unemployed income, M
j









t is the job ﬁnding probability for an unemployed worker when aggregate conditions are j. Note that
the workers’ asset equations, and particularly the value of unemployment B
j
t do depend on the state of the
economy and on the job ﬁlling rate q
j
t, so that the pure time derivative is necessarily present in equation 5.
4 Aggregate State Contingent Steady State and General Equilib-
rium
As we indicate with mil
ij







where Uj is aggregate unemployment when the state of the economy is j
One can think of an aggregate state contingent equilibrium as a situation in which the economy would
eventually settle if there were no more changes in aggregate productivity (Rogerson Pries, 1998). This
6means that in an aggregate state contingent equilibrium vacancy posting and total employment at each ﬁrm
i are constant and so is aggregate unemployment. For a ﬁrm for which operating is optimal, employment
is constant whenever there is no aggregate shock and the number of vacancies posted is identical to job
destruction induced by natural turnover.
Deﬁnition 4 In an aggregate state contingent steady state all time varying variables are constant.
When employment in each ﬁrm i is constant, job creation is equal to job destruction at the ﬁrm level







where the state state variables are not indexed by time to indicate that are constant in steady state. The




∀Jij > 0 (6)










∀Jij > 0 (7)
where the latter equation made use of the vacancy posting in ﬁrm ij of equation (6). The aggregate number






where the max operator is consistent with the fact that vacancies are posted only in ﬁrms with positive
value functions Jij. An aggregate equilibrium is a value of qj consistent with the value assumed at the ﬁrm






























7so that only hiring ﬁrms are considered in equation (10). The constant kj, which records the set of parameters
and functions that vary with the aggregate state will play a key role in the dynamic analysis of the next
sections.
Deﬁnition 5 An aggregate state contingent equilibrium in state j is a set of value functions Jij,A ij,employment
level lij, vacancies vij and a value of the job ﬁlling rate qj that satisfy
• optimal vacancy posting
• optimal employment
• steady state employment
• aggregate consistency in qj
We are already in a position to proof the following proposition
Proposition 6 An aggregate state contingent equilibrium with positive qj exists and it is unique if and
only if kj>0
Proof. To proof the uniqueness of the equilibrium it suﬃces to study the slope of the r.h.s and the l.h.s
of equation (10). The l.h.s side is a monotonically increasing convex function of qj that crosses the origin.
The r.h.s. is a parabola with a maximum at (kj
γ )1/2. The key condition for uniqueness and existence is that
the parabola displays positive values in the origin, or that kj > 0, which is simply a condition for a viable
labor market, in the sense that it ensures that a positive number of vacancies is posted in equilibrium.
The solution of the equilibrium works as follows. First, from equation (4) the set of value functions Jij is
obtained. Next, the general equilibrium value of qj is derived by equation (10). Finally, once the job ﬁnding
rate is determined, equilibrium unemployment is determined by equation 7 and the aggregate number of
v a c a n c i e si sg i v e nb ye q u a t i o n( 8 ) .
The aggregate model features a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the stock
of vacancies, or a Beveridge curve as it is typically known in the literature. Formally, in steady state











which is a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the aggregate stock of vacancies con-
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Figure 1: Existence and Uniqueness of an Aggregate State Contingent Equilibrium
4.1 Basic Comparative Static
Basic comparative static around the state contingent steady state can easily be performed with respect to the
job ﬁlling rate. All results are in line with the equilibrium unemployment matching models (Pissarides 1987,
2000), even though in such models the key macro variable is typically market tightness, or the aggregate
vacancy unemployment ratio V J
UJ , a variable that is negatively related to the job ﬁlling rate by the matching
function. The job ﬁlling rate qj depends directly, through equation (10), on the parameters ρ,γ,α, and
kj,where kj is it self a function of the rest of the structural parameters at the ﬁrm level. In the appendix
we report the formal derivation of the comparative static results.
The comparative steady state statistics can be studied graphically under the assumption that there is










Table 1 summarizes the comparative static eﬀects of the key parameters of the model. The eﬀect on
the job ﬁlling rate is analytically determined, while the eﬀect on the other key macrovariables, notably the
unemployment rate, the stock of vacancy and their ratio, is determined by numerical simulations around the
s t e a d ys t a t ec a l i b r a t e di ns e c t i o n[ 5 ] .
The aggregate productivity p is the key parameter and represents the driving force in our business
cycle analysis of the next sections. An increase in aggregate productivity reduces the job ﬁlling rate qj.
Analytically such eﬀect is determined by the positive relationship between p and kj a n do nt h en e g a t i v e
relationship of the latter on qj in equation 10, as shown in the appendix. The graphical interpretation
9is obtained from the shifting of the r.h.s of equation 12. The economics works as follows. An increase in
productivity increases the marginal value of the job, so that ﬁrms’ incentive to post new vacancies are higher,
thus increasing the vacancy unemployment ratio. In equilibrium, ﬁrm competition for hiring unemployed
workers increases and each ﬁrm ﬁnds it more diﬃcult to ﬁll in the new vacancies. The other side of the coin,
typical of search market, is that unemployed workers will ﬁnd jobs more easily. The total eﬀect of aggregate
productivity on the unemployment rate is thus the result of two opponent forces: a negative eﬀect through
the value of the job Ji and a negative eﬀect through the job ﬁlling rate qj, as it is evident from equation
7. In equilibrium the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, so that unemployment is countercyclical vis-à-vis changes in the
aggregate productivity. Similar eﬀects are at work for the aggregate vacancy rate.
The parameter γ is a pure friction parameter in the matching function, and it thus reduces the job ﬁlling
rate, the vacancy unemployment rate and increases the unemployment rate.
The discount rate reduces the ﬁrm value function and in turns reduces the ﬁrm incentives to post new
vacancies. In equilibrium the job ﬁlling rate is larger, as analytically identiﬁed by the negative relationship
between q and kj and by the negative eﬀect of the discount rate on kj. In turn, the vacancy unemployment
rate is lower, unemployment rate is larger and so is the aggregate stock of vacancies.
The eﬀect of the natural turnover rate ρ on the job ﬁlling rate is more complicate, since the turnover rate
aﬀects qj directly as well as indirectly through the eﬀect of the turnover rate on the parameter kj. The latter
eﬀect is similar to a larger discount rate on the ﬁrm value function while the former is akin to a shift of the
Beveridge curve. As shown in the Appendix, the two eﬀects reinforce each other and larger turnover rate ρ
reduces the job ﬁlling rate. Further, in the aggregate economy unemployment increases and the number of
vacancies fall.
When the model features more than one type of ﬁrms the conditional steady state displays also a distri-







ρc and the model features a distribution of employment across ﬁr m sw i t he a c he m p l o y m e n t
size lij having a weight proportional to the number of ﬁrms of type i.












The eﬀ ect on qj is analytically determined
The eﬀ ect on other variables is based










Figure 2: The eﬀects of an increase in productivity p
4.2 Dynamics around the state contingent steady state
We ﬁrst consider the economy in state contingent equilibrium qj and ask whether, starting from a general
initial value qo, the economy converges to the unique value qj. Technically the aggregate consistency between
q
j















where kj is given by equation (11). After a few steps of Algebra (see Appendix), using the deﬁnition of

















The previous equation is a nonlinear diﬀerential equation in q
j
t which governs the behavior of the aggregate
economy given a state j. Setting ˙ q
j










which is obviously the steady qj d e r i v e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 0 ) .T h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o ne s t a b l i s ht h ek e yr e s u l t
Proposition 7 The unique state contingent steady state is globally stable











































Figure 3: Fundamental Diﬀerential Equation for Diﬀerent Values of α
Since ˙ q
j























which is deﬁnitely negative when α>1
2.W h e nα ≤ 1
2 there can be diﬀerent dynamic acceleration but the
global stability is ensured by the uniqueness of the zero. Taking the limit of ˙ q
j
t it is immediate to see that
limqt→0 ˙ q
j
t =+ ∞. Figure 3 shows the fundamental diﬀerential equation for α =1 /2 and α =0 .3.I n t h e
latter case, the equilibrium is still unique but ˙ q
j
t is not monotonic.
4.3 Business Cycles
The fundamental diﬀerential equation of the model has a unique stable equilibrium but can not be solved
analytically. Yet, numerical solutions are easily obtained.1 Given an initial condition on the fob ﬁlling rate
q
j
0, with the solution to the diﬀerential equation qj(t) it is possible to to obtain a full dynamic path toward
the steady state also for unemployment U
j
t and the stock of vacancies V
j
t . The system is then described by










The stochastic version of the model is represented by ﬂuctuations around diﬀerent state contingent steady
states. The state of the economy is described by the aggregate productivity pj, and following a change in
state pk the economy will jumps to a new diﬀerential equation qk
t .
In the basic calibration of the next section we work with a stochastic model with two diﬀerent values
p1 and p2 so that the diﬀerential equation is fully characterized by two key constants k1 and k2.F i g u r e4
1The numerical solution of the diﬀerential equation is obtained with the ode23 command in matlab



















Figure 4: Diﬀerential Equation in Good an Bad Times
reports the diﬀerential equation in the good state (pj = p2 and k = k2) and bad states (pj = p1 and k = k1).
Note that the economy in good times (when kj = k2) jumps to a lower diﬀerential equations and features a
lower steady state value of qj (q2 <q 1) in line with the comparative static of the previous section.
Figure 5 plots the full path of the economy as the state switches from one state to the other. The
convergence is fairly fast, and the system increases (decreases) monotonically as it moves from the good
(bad) to the bad (good) state.
5 Baseline Calibration and Simulation
The paper focuses on the cyclical properties of the U.S. labour market, as recently summarized by Shimer
(2005a). He reports the key cyclical statistics for the six key macro variables in the labour market, namely the
unemployment rate, the vacancy rate, the vacancy unemployment ratio, the job ﬁnding rate, the separation
rate and aggregate productivity. In line with the business cycle literature, all variables are reported in
cyclical component, measured as percentage deviation from a smoothing parameter (which is an HP ﬁlter
with smoothing parameter 105). The key summary statistics analyzed are the standard deviation and
autocorrelation of each cyclical component, and their correlation matrix. The statistics compiled by Shimer
are reported in Table 2 and we refer to the original work for the detailed deﬁnition of each variable.
Aggregate productivity, which features a standard deviation of 2 percent, is assumed as the driving force
in most macromodels of the labour market. Fluctuations in the separation rate are considered a further
potential driving source, even though in the current paper we take them as ﬁxed. What is called in the















Figure 5: Time proﬁle of qj(t) in good and bad times
literature as the Shimer puzzle is the large volatility of the vacancy unemployment ratio. In the U.S.
quarterly time series the v/u ratio features a standard deviation around 40 percent, approximately 20 times
larger than the standard deviation of productivity. This suggests that the U.S. labour market features a large
degree of ampliﬁcation of business cycle shocks, and the claim of Shimer is that such ampliﬁcation power is
missing in the baseline matching model. Note that the ratio of the two standard deviations, measured in
log diﬀerences around a smooth trend, is also a measure of the elasticity of the vacancy unemployment ratio
to productivity changes, and features a value of 19.3. In the real world the vacancy unemployment ratio
responds to various shocks so that the empirical elasticity is lower. One way to estimate this is to regress
the cyclical component of the v/u ratio on productivity. The result can be read directly from Table 2, since
it is just the ratio of the two standard deviations times their correlation (0.39 in the Table). The value of
the elasticity one obtains in this case is thus 7.56.
The baseline calibration that we propose show the strong similarities between the model proposed and
the standard matching model. The similarity is particularly strong when the model does not feature any
hiring freeze or any bankruptcy. In other words, we base our initial calibration to an economy with only
one type of ﬁrm (I =1 ) . Yet, as long as jmax > 1 the economy is subject to aggregate productivity shocks
and it ﬂuctuates around diﬀerent state contingent steady states. In what follows we show that the model
features cyclical properties very similar to the baseline calibration proposed by Shimer (2005a), and indeed
fails largely to account for the cyclical variability of the vacancy unemployment ratio.
The calibration is displayed in Table 3. We take the period as representing 1 quarter. The matching
function requires to specify two parameters: the matching elasticity α and the matching constant (the
14friction parameter γ). The matching elasticity is a key parameter for the stability of the key diﬀerential
equation. It is set in Table 3 to 0.5, a value that is largely recognized in the empirical literature (Petrongolo
and Pissarides 2001) as a central value in the range of available estimates. The matching constant is
chosen so that the average unemployment rate displayed in the simulation matches the average monthly U.S.
unemployment of 5.6 percent over the reference period.
The stochastic process requires setting a value for the average productivity, specifying the number of
aggregate states (i.e.jmax) and their transition rates. For the average productivity level we follow Shimer
(2005) and set an average productivity level equal to 1.F o rt h es t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s s ,w ef o l l o wam i n i m a l i s t
approach and we work with only two aggregate states and a ﬁxed transition rate. λ is set to 0.02 and the
values of p2 p1 are chosen so that the standard deviation of the cyclical component of productivity in the
model generated data (using a smoothing parameter of 105 as in the original data) is roughly equal to 0.02.
The natural turnover rate is 0.9 and is set so as to obtain an aggregate quarterly unemployment inﬂows
consistent with the average statistics compiled by Shimer, which report an average monthly job separation
rate equal to 0.0374. The pure interest rate is set to 0.015. The ﬁring costs are set equal to zero in the
baseline calibration, and take a positive (small) value only when we model hiring freeze in section 6.3.
The ﬁxed wage rate is the most important parameter to set for the model’s dynamic properties, as we
show in the discussion on the literature in Section 7. In what follows we set a value of the wage equal to
0.75, which induces an ampliﬁcation of the model similar to the Shimer calibration of the MP model with
endogenous wages. Note that the size of the wage determines also the value of operational proﬁts. A value
of 0.75 corresponds to sizeable proﬁts and rents from market participation.
The marginal cost of vacancy is equal to 0.7,s ot h a ti tr e p r e s e n t ss o m e70 percent of ﬂow output. While
this number looks high, it has no impact on the calibration of the elasticity of the vacancy unemployment
ratio. This feature is well known in the literature, and it is further conﬁrmed in the discussion of Section 7.
The value of c, and particular the ratio of c to the mass of ﬁrms m is important for calibrating the average
value of the job ﬁlling rate and the job ﬁnding rate2.W h i l et h e r ei sn oe s t i m a t eo ft h ej o bﬁlling rate, the
job ﬁnding rate is estimated by Shimer, it amounts to a quarterly value of 1.35. Our calibration is meant to
capture this key average statistic. To simulate the model with ﬁrm heterogeneity the last parameters to set
are the ﬁrm idiosyncratic component (the productivity of the representative ﬁrm) and the number of ﬁrms.
η2 is set to 0 so that the representative ﬁrm follows the average productivity. The choice of the parameter
m2 is set also to target an average vacancy unemployment ratio equal to 1,av a l u et h a ti so f t e nt a k e na sa
reference point.
The simulations are based on [100] repetitions of time series of 500 periods with the ﬁrst 100 observations
2The key steady state relationship for q with α =1 /2 and only one type of ﬁrms is




(p + η − w)
15that are disregarded to reduce the importance of initial conditions. The simulated statistics are logged and
ﬁltered with the same ﬁlter parameter of 105. The results of the baseline simulations are reported in Table 4.
The standard deviation of productivity is indeed very close to the 2 percentage standard deviation presents
in U.S. data. The autocorrelation of the macrovariables is also very high, slightly lower than the actual one
mainly because of the autocorrelation displayed by our simple stochastic process.
The model captures well the correlation between unemployment and the other key variables. The negative
correlation between unemployment and vacancies, or the Beveridge curve as it is known and presented above,
is very much present in the model generated data. The other correlation are also as negative as in the data.
The main failure of the model in Table 4 lies in its inability to match the cyclical standard deviations.
With a cyclical variation of aggregate productivity of around 2 percentage point, the cyclical variation of the
vacancy unemployment ratio is 0.040, against a value in the U.S. data of 0.382. The variability displayed by
the model is an order of magnitude lower than what is displayed by the U.S. data. The elasticity of market
tightness over employment is indeed 2.0, very similar to Shimer (2005, Table 3). In this sense, the model we
propose features the same cyclical characteristics of the baseline matching model with endogenous wages.
As pointed out by Mortensen and Nagypal (2005), and as we argue in the discussion of Section 7, the
key issue is not the wage variability per se. The lack of ampliﬁcation of the model is linked to the large
diﬀerence between labor productivity and the wage implied by the assigned magnitude of the parameters.
In our baseline calibration we have used a “large” diﬀerence between average productivity and a ﬁxed wage,
so as to obtain results very similar to the baseline calibration of Shimer.
Table 2: Summary Statistics, Quarterly U.S. Data, 1951-2003
uv v / u f ρ p
Standard Deviation 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118 0.075 0.020
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.908 0.733 0.878
Correlation Matrix u 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949 0.709 -0.408
v - 1 0.975 0.897 -0.684 0.364
v/u - - 1 0.948 -0.715 0.396
f - - - 1 -0.574 0.396
ρ - - - - 1 -0.524
p - ----1
u is the unemployment rate; v is the vacancy rate
v/u is the vacancy unemployment ratio; f is the job ﬁ nding rate
f is the job ﬁ nding rate; p is aggregate productivity
Source: Shimer 2005
16Table 3: Parameter Values in Simulation
Parameter Notation Value
Interest Rate r 0.0150
Natural Turnover ρ 0.1000
Search cost c 0.7000
Firing cost F 0
Matching Function
Matching Elasticity α 0.5000
Matching Constant γ 0.6600
Stochastic Process
Fixed Common Productivity p 1
Macro states j
max 2
Good state p2 0.0290
Bad state p1 -0.0290







Type of Firms I 2
η1 -0.2600
Source: Authors calculation
6 Simulation With Hiring Freeze and Bankruptcies
We now turn to the model with ﬁrm heterogeneity and with turnover on the extensive margin. Before
calibrating the model with entry and exit for ﬁrms, we review the basic key summary facts of employment
gains and losses associated to ﬁrm entry and exit
6.1 Basic Facts on Employment Flows Associated to Firm Entry and Exit
From the macroeconomic standpoint, the key features of employment gains and losses associated by the
process of ﬁrm entry and exit can be summarized as follows.
• A v e r a g ej o bc r e a t i o na n dd e s t r u c t i o nb yﬁrm entry and exit amounts, on average, to 3.8 percent of
employment;
• j o bc r e a t i o nb yﬁrm entrants is procyclical while job destruction by ﬁrm exit is countercyclical;
• job creation and destruction on the extensive margins take place in ﬁrms that are very small relatively
to incumbent;
17Table 4: Baseline Simulation
No Hiring Freeze; No Bakruptcies
m1= 0 ; m2= 0.0200
uv v / u f p
Standard Deviation 0.0148 0.0288 0.0406 0.0163 0.0197
(0 . 0 0 2 6) (0 . 0 0 4 6) (0 . 0 0 6 5) (0 . 0 0 4 6) (0 . 0 0 2 7)
Autocorrelation 0.9672 0.8675 0.9100 0.8733 0.9065
(0 . 0 1 1 2) (0 . 0 3 3 2) (0 . 0 2 6 7) (0 . 0 3 2 0) (0 . 0 3 4 7)
Correlation u 1 -0.7084 -0.8648 -0.9889 -0.7092
(0 . 0 3 1 0) (0 . 0 2 2 7) (0 . 0 0 3 4) (0 . 0 3 0 9)
v 1 0.9668 0.7663 0.9994
( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0213 ) ( 2.1407e-004 )
v/u 1 0.9021 0.9667
(0 . 0 1 4 8) (0 . 0 0 2 0)
f 1 0.7630
(0 . 0 2 2 0)
p 1
Standard errors in parentheses
Average Job Finding Rate= 1.3822
Elasticity of v/u with respect to p= 2.0635
Source: Authors calculation
• job destruction (creation) by ﬁrm exit (entry) does not exceed 2 percent of total employment in a given
quarter;
• entry and exit patterns are highly correlated across industries.
Statistics on ﬁrm and entry have been compiled by Davis et al. (1996) for the manufacturing sector and
more recently by the Business Employment Dynamics (2004) for the entire U.S. manufacturing industry.
Davis et al. provide a fairly large time series (from 1972 to 1988) while the Business Employment Dynamics
covers a shorter period (1992-2003), but it is much more reliable in terms of macroeconomic estimates, since
employment in manufacturing in the U.S. corresponds to less than 15 percent of total employment. Business
Employment Dynamics ﬁnds that, on average, ﬁrm entry and exit account for 3.8percent of employment.
Employment gains are procyclical and employment losses are countercylical. In other words, ﬁrms enter
in good times and leave the market in bad times. Business Employment Dynamics (2004) argues that the
employment ﬂows driven by entry and exit are less cyclical than those derived by incumbents. This feature
can be estimated with the relative long time series compiled by Davis and Haltiwanger (1996). The cyclical
correlation of the cyclical component of job creation and destruction and net employment growth is 0.2for
j o bc r e a t i o na n d −0.28for job destruction
The structural characteristics of the process of entry and exit are provided, among others by Bartelsman
et al. (2005) and by Dunne et al. (1989). The small size of entrants and exit is clearly documented by
18Bartelsman et al. (2005). They show that the average ﬁrm entering and exit the market features an average
size that in the U.S. is approximately 10 percent of the employment of incumbent ﬁrms.
Despite their cyclical variability, job gains and losses by incumbent ﬁrms never exceed 2 percentage of
total employment. The 2 percent refers to the cyclically adjusted measure. In cyclically unadjusted data the
c y c l i c a l i t yi sa sh i g ha s2.5 percent.
6 . 2 S i m u l a t i o nw i t hE n t r ya n dE x i t
We now present the simulation of the model with heterogeneous ﬁrms. This section focuses on job ﬂows by
ﬁrm entry and exit, a process that in the model is obtained by the existence of marginal ﬁrms, or by ﬁrms
whose operation is aggregate state contingent. As it is clear from equation (4) ﬁrm entry increases with
improvements in aggregate conditions while ﬁrm exit is more likely when conditions worsen.
I nt h ee x a m p l ew ep r o v i d et h e r ea r eo n l y2t y p eo fﬁrms. Type 2 ﬁrms are the incumbent ﬁrms and have
idiosyncratic component η2. Marginal ﬁrms are labelled type 1 ﬁrms in Table 4, and feature η1 <η 2.I n
equilibrium, the job value function of marginal ﬁrms turns negative in bad business (formally we have that
J11 < 0 and J12 > 0). If there are no wasteful ﬁring costs such ﬁrms naturally shed labour and declare
bankruptcy. Bankrupt ﬁrms shed labour in bad times and in good times post a number of vacancies so as to
satisfy their long run employment size. We calibrate marginal ﬁrms so that η1 = −0.26. The corresponding
value functions, or the results of the functional equation 4, yields values J11 =0 .5 and J12 = −0.2.T h e
latter condition ensures entry and exit in equilibrium.
Note that the marginal ﬁrms are naturally small ﬁrms, in line with the basic facts provided above. In our
simulation, the long run employment of these ﬁrms amounts to only 1 percent of the size of incumbent ﬁrms.
The most important parameter to calibrate is m1 since it regulates the size of employment and vacancy
ﬂuctuations induced by ﬁrm entry and exit (m1l1). From the macroeconomic standpoint the constraint on
m1 is provided by the employment loss accounted for by ﬁrm exit. Such measure does not exceeds 2 percent
of total employment. Since bankruptcy in the model takes place only when the macroconditions change, the
relevant statistics is not the average employment loss induced by bankruptcy (which in the simulated data
would be very small) but rather the maximum loss.
Further, with respect to the calibration of Table 4, in the new set of simulation it is necessary to reduce
t h es i z eo ft h ea g g r e g a t es h o c k sp1 and p2 so as to obtain an aggregate standard deviation around 2 percent,
as in the U.S. data. These values are reported in the bottom of Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5 reports the results of the simulations. The hiring and ﬁring induced by the entry and exit of
these small ﬁrms increases the ampliﬁcation power of the model. The standard deviation of the vacancy
unemployment ratio increases to 0.07, and now accounts for almost 20 percent of the total ampliﬁcation of
productivity shocks displayed in the data. Table 5 shows that the maximum amount of job losses accounted
for bankruptcy displayed in Table 5 amounts to some 2 percent of the total labour force. The presence
19of bankruptcy works mainly through the standard deviation of unemployment, which appears to increase
substantially with respect to the simulations of Table in 4. The results of Table 5 show that explicitly
considering bankruptcy by marginal ﬁrms double the propagation power of the model .
Table 5: Bankruptcy Simulation
No hiring Freeze; Bankruptcies
m1= 0.1100 ; m2= 0.0200
uv v / u f p
Standard Deviation 0.0438 0.0277 0.0682 0.0460 0.0215
(0 . 0 0 8 4) (0 . 0 0 5 5) (0 . 0 1 3 0) (0 . 0 0 5 5) (0 . 0 0 8 7)
Autocorrelation 0.8557 0.8674 0.8636 0.8823 0.8376
(0 . 0 2 0 8) (0 . 0 3 2 0) (0 . 0 2 4 6) (0 . 0 2 8 6) (0 . 0 2 4 8)
Correlation u 1 -0.8030 -0.9697 -0.9982 -0.8022
( 0.0424 ) ( 0.0084 ) ( 5.2210e-004 ) ( 0.0422 )
v 1 0.9239 0.8218 0.9990
( 0.0164 ) ( 0.0377 ) ( 6.1905e-004 )
v/u 1 0.9762 0.9230
(0 . 0 0 6 2) (0 . 0 1 6 2)
f 1 0.8188
(0 . 0 3 7 4)
p 1
γ = 0.7700
p2 = 0.0300 ;p1 -0.0300
Average Job Finding Rate= 1.3397
Elasticity of v/u with respect to p = 3.1713
Maximum Job Loss by Bankruptcy = 0.0202
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Authors calculation
6.3 Simulation with Hiring Freeze
The process of ﬁrm entry and exit modeled above suggests that the value of business in marginal ﬁrms
ﬂuctuates between J11 =0 .5 and J12 = −0.2. This implies that a wasteful ﬁring costs of only 20 percent of
average productivity is suﬃcient to generate a hiring freeze. In what follows, we simulate the model under
a hiring freeze by assuming that such admittedly small ﬁring costs exist in the economy.
The simulations in the case of hiring freeze is reported in Table 6. A hiring freeze acts mainly through the
behavior of vacancies, so that their explicit consideration should increase the dynamic response of vacancies
to productivity shocks. This is what we ﬁnd in Table 6. The variability of the vacancy unemployment ratio
accounted by the model increases to 0.077, accounting almost for 20 percent of the variability in the data.
Note that in the simulations proposed the marginal ﬁrms, albeit small, are fairly numerous and account for
some [17] percent of employment. In other words, some 17 percent of employment is employed in ﬁrms that
20shut down their entire vacancy posting in bad times.
I nt h ec a s eo fh i r i n gf r e e z ei ti sm o r ed i ﬃcult to calibrate the number of marginal ﬁrms. As Shimer
(2005b) points out, “most contractions in employment are achieved by ﬁr m sc h o o s i n gt oh i r ef e w e rw o r k e r s ” ,
but there is no direct evidence for the size of this eﬀect. As a matter of exercise, the number of marginal
ﬁrms experiencing a hiring freeze can be increased substantially, and in Table 7 is as high as 40 percent of
total employment. In such extreme case, the model is able to account for 35 percent of the total ampliﬁcation
displayed by U.S. data.
Table 6: Hiring Freeze Simulation
Hiring Freeze; No Bankruptcies
m1= 0.1200 ; m2= 0.0200
uv v / u f p
Standard Deviation 0.0285 0.0548 0.0779 0.0310 0.0213
(0 . 0 0 5 6) (0 . 0 1 0 0) (0 . 0 1 4 4) (0 . 0 1 0 0) (0 . 0 0 6 0)
Autocorrelation 0.9787 0.8760 0.9169 0.8824 0.9514
(0 . 0 0 5 7) (0 . 0 2 2 4) (0 . 0 1 7 3) (0 . 0 2 1 3) (0 . 0 1 7 1)
Correlation u 1 -0.7218 -0.8727 -0.9931 -0.7246
(0 . 0 2 1 9) (0 . 0 1 5 9) (0 . 0 0 1 9) (0 . 0 2 1 7)
v 1 0.9677 0.7819 0.9998
( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0148 ) ( 8.1558e-005 )
v/u 1 0.9126 0.9686
(0 . 0 0 9 9) (0 . 0 0 1 8)
f 1 0.7829
(0 . 0 1 4 9)
p 1
Standard errors in parentheses
γ 0.6000
η1 -0.2600
p2 0.0290 ;p1 -0.0290
Average Job Finding Rate 1.4286
Elasticity of v/u with respect to p 3.6579
Maximum employment by ﬁ rms that freeze hiring 0.1763
Source: Authors calculation
7 Discussion and Literature Review
The ability of the matching model of unemployment to account for the business cycle properties of the
U.S. labour market has sparked a large open debate in the macroeconomics of the labour market. Shimer
calibration showed that the MP model accounts for only 10 percent of the total variability of the vacancy
unemployment ratio. He claims that such inability is linked to the wage variability of the Nash Bargaining
wage used in the standard model. As he argues in his paper, following an increase in labor productivity
21Table 7: Extreme Hiring Freeze Simulation
Hiring Freeze; No Bankruptcies
m1= 0.3600 ; m2= 0.0200
uv v / u f p
Standard Deviation 0.0528 0.0998 0.1445 0.0578 0.0215
(0 . 0 0 9 6) (0 . 0 1 6 2) (0 . 0 2 4 0) (0 . 0 1 6 2) (0 . 0 1 0 3)
Autocorrelation 0.9770 0.8685 0.9111 0.8779 0.9495
(0 . 0 0 6 7) (0 . 0 2 6 3) (0 . 0 2 1 5) (0 . 0 2 4 4) (0 . 0 1 5 2)
Correlation u 1 -0.7678 -0.8960 -0.9923 -0.7732
(0 . 0 1 9 7) (0 . 0 1 4 3) (0 . 0 0 2 1) (0 . 0 1 9 2)
v 1 0.9724 0.8287 0.9998
( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0114 ) ( 3.9768e-005 )
v/u 1 0.9355 0.9742
(0 . 0 0 7 2) (0 . 0 0 1 6)
f 1 0.8321
(0 . 0 1 1 2)
p 1
Standard errors in parentheses
γ= 0.6600
η1= -0.2600
p2= 0.0290 ;p1= -0.0290
Average Job Finding Rate= 1.4342
Elasticity of v/u with respect to p= 6.7283
Maximum employment by ﬁ rms that freeze hiring= 0.3861
Source: Authors calculation
vacancy posting increases, but “the increase in hiring also shorten unemployment duration, raising workers’
threat point in wage bargaining, and therefore raising the expected present value of wages in new jobs.
Higher wages absorb most of the productivity increase, eliminating the incentive for vacancy creation. As a
result, ﬂuctuations in labor productivity have little impact on the unemployment, vacancy, and job ﬁnding
rates”.
Hall (2005) ﬁnds that a rigid wage, not conditioned on the aggregate state and consistent with the bar-
gaining set can explain the volatility of unemployment given quantitative speciﬁcation of the other elements
of the model. More recently Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) argue that a ﬁxed wage is not the solution to the
low ampliﬁcation power of the model. The key diﬃculty for matching the vacancy unemployment ratio is a
large diﬀerence between labor productivity and the wage implied by the standard model. The easiest way to
show this key result is to consider the simplest matching model without aggregate shocks and a ﬁxed wage
(See Appendix and Mortensen and Nagypal, section 3.43). The elasticity of the vacancy unemployment rate
3In the appendix we also show that a generalization of our model with vacancy costs that take the form c(v)=c0 + cv
converges to the same baseline matching model when the c → 0,




where α is the elasticity of the matching function and w is the ﬁxed wage. This suggests that the size of
p−w is a key parameter in this simple model, and only wages very close to the productivity can dramatically
increase this elasticity. Indeed, εθ,p tends to inﬁnity as the wage tends to average productivity. Manovksii
and Hagedorn (2005) were the ﬁrst to point out that a wage very close to productivity would perfectly match
the required elasticity. They calibrated (p−w)/w to be around 3 percent of employment on the basis of the
average proﬁt rate in the U.S. economy and their calibration match the required elasticity. In general it is
far from obvious that one can use p − w as the proﬁt rate, since the model has no capital costs and other
factors.
The spirit of this paper, in relation to the debate in the literature outlined above, is the focus on ﬁrm
heterogeneity. Our results can be interpreted as follows. There is more than one type of ﬁrm, and alongside
stable ﬁrms, which behave very similarly to those modeled in the standard model, there is a marginal fringe
of ﬁrms whose vacancy posting behavior is very volatile. For such marginal ﬁrms, whose nature of operation
changes dramatically between good and bad times, the ratio p/(p − w) is indeed very small, and thus
contributes substantially to increase aggregate volatility and the model’s ability to match the data. Firms
who go bankrupt and ﬁrms that experience hiring freeze must necessarily act on a margin for which the proﬁt
rate is very small. The composition eﬀect between these ﬁrms can be important for the macroeconomy.
These claims can be made more formal by considering the elasticity of the vacancy unemployment calcu-




where θ is market tightness or the vacancy unemployment ratio V
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In our baseline simulation with I =1and η2 ' 0. The average value of θ is around 12, so that simple
substitution for the calibrated statistics above gives a value of the elasticity equal to 2.6. Such value, albeit
23larger than the simulated value of Table 4, shows that the steady state appromixation of the elasticity is
quantitatively relevant.
Consider the model with only two type of ﬁrms that we have solved. While stable ﬁrms have η2 ' 0













(p−w) if pj = p1
In this approximation it is clear that marginal ﬁrms in good times can increase substantially the ampli-
ﬁcation power of the model. Such ampliﬁcation power, captured by the fraction m1
m1+m2 depends on their
relative size, and it is thus not surprising that the elasticity increase most in the extreme hiring freeze sce-
nario. In the case of bankruptcy, where we calibrate the statistics m1/(m1 + m2) to be 0.84 the elasticity
in good times increase by a multiplier factor equal to 6. Note, however, that the the overall elasticity de-
pends also on its value in bad times and on the function h(θ
j), which is negatively related to θ. This latter
eﬀects works in the opposite direction and tends to reduce the estimated elasticity. Further, note that the
elasticity obtained by the analytical expression tends to be larger than the one obtained by the numerical
simulation. This diﬀerence is linked to the slow downsizing of employment toward the steady state value in
the simulations, while the elasticity assumed above is valid when the economy is already in steady state.
By focussing on ﬁrm heterogeneity, the paper has not dealt with wage determination issues. Even though
wage variability is not the key determinants of unemployment dynamics, as we argued above, the ﬁxed wage
assumed in this paper can be hard to swallow. Focusing on a static version of the paper, the appendix shows
that it is possible to obtain a full general equilibrium with endogenous wage, where the ﬁrm wage is obtained
by rent sharing.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The paper has proposed a matching model of unemployment with ﬁrms active along both the intensive
and extensive margin. In the standard model of unemployment, ﬁrms are not well deﬁned and there is no
distinction between ﬁrms and jobs. In the model we propose a convex cost for vacancy posting ensures that
ﬁrms have a well deﬁned long run position. On the intensive margin workers quits the ﬁrm at an exogenous
attrition rate, and ﬁrms continuously post new vacancies. The steady state version of the model delivers
predictions that are very similar to those of the standard matching model.
With aggregate productivity shocks, the model can easily generate job ﬂows on the extensive margins of
ﬁrm entry and exit. The paper characterizes a hiring freeze and a bankruptcy. Hiring freeze is experienced
by those ﬁrms that shut down their vacancy posting behavior in adverse business conditions, and let em-
ployment downsizing be governed by workers’ natural attrition. Bankrupt ﬁrms leave the market altogether
24in the face of adverse shocks. The paper has shown that the modeling of these phenomena has aggregate
consequences. The quantitative exercise in the paper has shown that considering these phenomena can in-
crease the responsiveness of the vacancy unemployment ﬂuctuations up to 30 percent of the total variability
observed in U.S. data.
9A p p e n d i x :
.1 Comparative Static of the Steady State Equilibrium






































Since γ measures the size of frictions
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Making use of the deﬁnition of employment dynamics ˙ l
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25.2.1 Baseline Matching Model with Exogenous Wage
The matching function is indicated with q(θ) The value function of a vacancy and a ﬁlled job read
rV = −c0 + q(θ)[J − V ]
(r +ρ)J = p − w +ρV






















Note that if the matching function is q = θ
−α α(θ)=α.
.3 Convergence of the Convex Model to a Baseline Matching Model
One can easily show that the model of this paper nests the baseline matching model described above as a special
case. Suppose that the marginal cost of vacancy posting take the form
c(v)=c0 +cv
where it is clear that throughout the paper we assumed that c0 =0 . Assume, for simplicity that there is only one type



















where κ = mJ . The previous equation is simply a generalization of equation 10. By simple algebra the equation












which the standard matching model with linear vacancy costs.
26.3.1 Elasticity in the Model with convex vacancy posting
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(15)





















mii[p +ηi − w]2











Σimi[p + ηi −w]

























.4 The Model With Endogenous Wage
We consider a static version of the model with only one type of ﬁrm. The value functions read
rA = −cv + q(J − A)
rJ = p − w +ρ(A − J)
rW = w + ρ(U − W)




Free entry implies A =0so that the stock of vacancies is determined by cv = qJ. The surplus from the job is
deﬁned as
S = J +W − A − U
and we assume that the wage is set so that the worker gets a fraction β of the total surplus. Using the fact that
A =0the surplus can be written as
(r + ρ)S = p −z −rU
so that substituting into the ﬁrm value function, using the fact that J =( 1− β)S one has that the wage solves
w =( 1− β)rU +βp
27exactly as was derived by Bertola and Garibaldi (2001). The expression of the ﬁrm in this case reads
J =
(1 − β)(p −rU)
r + ρ

















(r+ρ)c . Using the deﬁnition of the matching function, and the wage rule (W − U = βS) one has





p − z − rU
r + ρ
) (17)
The equilibrium is obtained by the intersection of the two functions 16 and 17. One can easily show, through simple
diﬀerentiation, that in equation 17 ∂rU
∂q < 0 while in equation 16 ∂rU
∂q > 0 so that and equilibrium exists.
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